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Abstract
We experimentally investigate the Jackson-Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over
policy proposals and the allocation of private goods. Key comparative static predictions of the
model hold with the introduction of private goods including “strange bedfellow” coalitions.
Private goods help to secure legislative compromise and increase the likelihood of proposals
passing, an outcome not predicted by the theory but a staple of the applied political economy
literature. Coalition formation is better characterized by an “efficient equal split” between
coalition partners than the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction, which has implications for
stable political party formation.
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Legislative bargaining often consists of dealing with public policy issues with strong
ideological elements (e.g., bank bailouts or abortion rights) along with purely distributive
(private good) allocations. The present paper experimentally investigates the Jackson-Moselle
(2002) model of legislative bargaining over public policy issues including the role private goods
play in policymaking, the nature of winning coalitions, and the stability of political parties. The
model simplifies the bargaining process to one in which legislators bargain over a single
dimensional public policy issue, possibly representing familiar distinctions between liberal and
conservative policy positions, and the distribution of private goods across legislative
constituencies. Legislators are assumed to have single peaked preferences over the policy issue
with differential “costs” to deviating from these preferences. In contrast, legislators have
uniform preferences over distributive goods, with each legislator preferring larger amounts for
his constituency. The introduction of private goods (aka pork) into the legislative bargaining
process is predicted to open up the possibility of “strange bedfellow” coalitions consisting of
legislators to the left and right of center, an outcome reliably observed in the data. Private goods
may also increase total welfare net of their cost. Although the latter is not predicted in our
experimental design, we find that net welfare increases as fewer relatively inefficient policies
pass. We also find that the introduction of distributive goods into the bargaining process
increases the likelihood of proposals passing. Although this too is not predicted in the theory, it
is consistent with field data showing that legislative compromise is easier with distributive goods
available to grease the wheels (Evans, 2004).
Our experiment employs the simplest possible setting with three legislators. We focus on
the comparative static predictions of the model with and without the presence of distributive
goods for forging legislative compromise. In the experimental treatment reported on in the body
of the paper, the total value of the legislators’ equilibrium payoffs remains constant between
bargaining over the public policy issue alone and bargaining over the public policy issue in
conjunction with private goods (net of the cost of the private goods). Key aggregate comparative
static predictions of the model are satisfied as the introduction of private goods shifts the average
location of the public policy issue significantly from near the median legislator’s preferred
outcome to a location that is closer to the preferred outcome of the extreme legislator who cares
the most about the issue (a result of strange bedfellow coalitions). Private goods also increase
the variance around the mean public policy outcome, as predicted within the theory.
2

The total value of players’ payoffs increases modestly, but significantly, with the
introduction of distributive goods after accounting for their cost. At a more micro level most, but
far from all, players with extreme public policy preferences effectively use distributive goods to
move the policy outcome closer to their preferred position. However, the more subtle prediction
in which the median legislator forms a coalition with the legislator with the more extreme policy
preferences fails, as most coalitions proposed by the median legislator are formed with the player
with closer policy preferences. This, in turn, has important implications for what constitute
viable political parties, resulting in only one, not two, viable parties as the Jackson-Moselle (JM)
model predicts under the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 1 briefly reviews results from earlier
extensive form legislative bargaining experiments in the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) tradition which
provides the springboard for the present research. Section 2 outlines the predictions of the JM
model for the parameter specification employed in the text. Section 3 describes the experimental
procedures, with Section 4 reporting the experimental results, along with the implications of
these results for what constitute stable political parties. Section 5 concludes with a brief
summary of the results and their similarities and differences with other legislative bargaining
experiments. There is a rather long appendix to the paper reporting the motivation for, as well as
outcomes, of a second set of treatment parameters. These results are relegated to an appendix as
(i) the main results are quite similar to those reported in the text, but (ii) the predictions of the
model along with the data analysis are complicated by the presence of a mixed strategy
equilibrium. There will be a brief discussion of these results in Section 4 where they help shape
our understanding of the main treatment outcomes. Readers with particular interests in
legislative bargaining models of the sort studied here are encouraged to read the appendix.
1. Previous Research on Multilateral Bargaining in the Shadow of a Voting Rule1
The present paper adds to the growing experimental literature on legislative bargaining in
games with a fixed extensive form. The inspiration for most of this research is the BaronFerejohn (BF) bargaining model. In the simplest version of the model, a committee of size n
(where n is an odd number) must decide over an allocation of money between the committee
members with one of the members “recognized” (typically selected at random) to make a
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This review closely follows the one offered in Palfrey (2012). For details, as well as a review of the earlier
legislative bargaining literature, see his survey.
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proposed allocation that is voted up or down. The game ends when a proposal is accepted by a
majority of members with the proposed allocation binding. If the proposal is rejected, there is a
new call for proposals, one of which is again randomly selected to be voted on, with this process
continuing indefinitely until a proposal is accepted. There are many variations of this basic game
generated by changing the recognition rule (unequal recognition probabilities) or the voting rule
(super majority or veto players), introducing time preferences (the amount of money available
shrinks by a factor δ ∈ [0, 1] if a proposal is rejected), having a terminal period T, allowing
amendments to the proposed allocation, specifying a status quo in case no proposal is accepted,
etc.
Most past experiments deal with divide the dollar games in which committee members
bargain over the allocation of private goods between legislative districts (McKelvey, 1991;
Diermeier and Morton, 2005; Fréchette, Kagel and Morelli, 2005a, b).2 Results from divide the
dollar games close in structure to the game reported on below (an infinite horizon game with δ =
1) are generally consistent with the comparative static predictions of the model, but with
significant deviations from the model’s point predictions as (1) The majority of games end
without delay, as the theory predicts, with this frequency growing with experience. (2) The
majority of games involve minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) as the theory predicts, with
their frequency growing with experience. (3) There is significant proposer power, but it is
typically far from the level predicted under the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE)
prediction. Closely related to (3) is that allocations with proposer power at, or near, the level
predicted under the SSPE would be voted down with near certainty.3 As predicted, proposer
power is diminished by allowing amendments to proposals (Frécehtte, Kagel and Lehrer, 2003)
and, for non-veto players, when a veto player is present (Kagel, Sung and Winter, 2010). Further,
proposer power increases with impatience (δ < 1) (Fréchette, Kagel and Morelli, 2005a) and for
veto players compared to games without veto players (Kagel et al., 2010).4
Extensions of the infinite horizon BF game to include choosing over public and private
goods (Volden and Wiseman, 2007) predict that when all players have the same value for the
2

To name but a few of the many papers in this area: Also see Diermeir and Gailmard (2006), Fréchette, Kagel and
Lehrer (2003), Fréchette (2009).
3
See Fréchette, Kagel and Morelli (2005 a, b, c). Results from dynamic divide the dollar games with an
endogenous status quo yield comparable results in that MWCs are observed about as much as in the BF game, with
more equal player shares than predicted and with proposals usually being accepted (Battaglini and Palfrey, in press).
4
For finite horizon games see Diermeier and Morton (2005) (games with a maximum of 5 rounds) and Diermeier
and Gilmard (2006) (1 round games).
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public good, and the marginal utility from the private good is not too large, only the proposer
obtains private goods in the SSPE, with proposers using public goods to obtain willing coalition
partners. Further, in the mixed region where both public and private goods are provided, as the
relative value of public good decreases, the model predicts, somewhat counter intuitively, that a
larger budget share will be allocated to the public good. Fréchette, Kagel and Morelli (2012)
show that the experimental data are largely consistent with this first prediction, as within the
mixed region allocations converge toward private goods being provided exclusively to the
proposer. However, the public good’s share of the budget decreases as the value of the public
good decreases, contrary to the model's prediction.5
Christiansen (2010) experimentally investigates a version of the Volden-Wiseman model
where two different blocks of legislators have different (but constant) marginal rates of
substitution between public and private goods. Depending on the proposer’s type, either private
goods or public goods will be used to secure legislative compromise, and to form a minimum
winning coalition, with both of these outcomes observed in the data. Several unpredicted results
are reported as well, including clear breakdowns of the stationarity assumption when private
good preferring types propose to take too much for themselves, as they get significantly smaller
payoffs following rejection of their proposed allocations.
In the Volden-Wiseman (VM) version of the BF legislative bargaining model pork and
public goods are funded from a common budget with the model focusing on the tradeoffs in the
budget allocation process between public and private goods. The public component of the JM
model consists of either a public policy proposal with an ideological component (e.g., limits on
abortion rights or gay marriage), which the VM model is not equipped to deal with, or a proposal
to fund the public good as in the VM model. In terms of funding levels for the public good, funds
for private goods are exogenous in the JM model, so one can think of the trade-off in the budget
process as between funding a given public good and funding other public goods, or funding a
given public good but one that also has local benefits (e.g., the location of military base has
additional economic benefits largely confined to the legislative district in which it is located).
The downside to this is that there is no direct mechanism for investigating the budgetary
tradeoffs between public and private goods as in the VW model. . However, the JM model
5

Battaglini et al. (in press) investigate a dynamic legislative bargaining model with durable public goods in which
all players have the same utility function which is linear in the private good with an additively separable concave
utility function for the public good.
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allows one to ask questions not explored in the previous literature regarding an important class of
public policy/public good issues, including how the introduction of private goods moves the
policy location chosen away from the median’s ideal point, how private goods impact efficiency,
and how private goods can get legislators with opposing ideologies to work together.
2. The Legislative Bargaining Model
The JM model employs a bargaining structure that is the same as the basic BaronFerejohn structure outlined in the previous section: In our case an infinite horizon game with n =
3, with proposers chosen randomly (with equal probability), proposals voted up or down without
the possibility of amendments, and δ = 1.6 A proposal is a vector (y, x1, x2, x3) consisting of a
public policy proposal y and a distributive proposal x1, x2, x3. The set of feasible public policy
proposals is [0, Y] where Y ∈ [0, 100] and the set of private allocations is such that xi ≥ 0 for
each i with ∑ xi ≤ X where X ≥ 0. When Y = 0, the model simplifies to the BF divide the dollar
game where X is the total amount of pure private goods to be distributed among legislative
districts. At the other extreme, when X = 0 the model reduces to a median voter game with Y
capturing the public policy decision.
Each legislator has preferences over decisions that depend on Y and xi, his or her share of
the private good. Legislator i’s utility function ui(y, xi) is nonnegative, continuous, and strictly
increasing in xi for every y ∈ Y. Preferences over the public policy are separable from the
distributive decision for each i and ui is single peaked in y, with the ideal point noted as yi*.
Legislators observe all proposals voted on, and the outcome of those votes, prior to
making any new proposals. As in the standard BF game, the full set of Nash equilibria for this
game is large, with some equilibria involving complex, contingent strategies. As is commonly
the case we focus on the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) for theoretical
predictions.
In games where X = 0 and δ = 1, the preferred point of the median legislator, ymed*, is
proposed and eventually approved with probability 1 in any SSPE. The intuition here is that a
proposal that is not at the median legislator’s ideal point will not win approval since the median
legislator, and the legislator to the other side of the proposed y, can wait and do better. In games
where X > 0 and Y > 0 there is a positive probability that a proposal wins approval with a

6

With δ = 1, the payoff at each legislators’ ideal point remains constant following rejection of a proposal, with X
remaining constant as well.
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coalition that excludes the median legislator. That is, there is a positive probability that a
proposal wins approval which includes members of a disjoint coalition. The next section
characterizes the possible SSPE outcomes under our experimental treatment conditions.
3. Experimental Design and Procedures
In implementing the game we wanted to employ a framework that would be natural for
subjects to think about the problem, yet invoke minimal meaning responses. We settled on
framing the decision in terms of a neutral public good, namely a “bus stop location”, with each
player, T1, T2, T3 having an ideal location for the bus stop at points 0, 33, and 100, respectively.
The cost for each integer deviation from a player’s ideal point was 1, 3, and 6 (referred to as an
agents unit walking costs, UWC). This setup is summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1

UWC = unit cost to each player for policy outcome deviating from their ideal point.
All payoffs and costs were characterized in terms of experimental currency units (ECUs),
which were converted into dollars at fixed conversion rate. Each player’s payoff at their ideal
point was fixed at 600 ECUs with returns to the public good location (R) calculated as follows:
Ri = 600 – UWCi│ yi* - yprop│
where yi* is Ti’s ideal point with yprop the proposed location for the bus stop. In the treatment
with both public and private goods the value of any private goods allocated to Ti was simply
added to Ri.
A between groups design was employed with baseline sessions consisting of games with
only public goods (X = 0), and with X = 100 for games with both public and private goods. The
SSPE in the baseline sessions is for the public good to be located at 33 with zero variance. With
private goods the average location for the public good is 49.7 with a variance of 740.7. Expected
7

total payoffs are 1365 with X = 0 and 1465 with private goods, for no net change in total payoffs
after subtracting out the total value of private goods. The SSPE consists of a pure strategy
equilibrium, with the public good location and private good allocation a function of the
proposer’s type reported in the Table 1. The efficient outcome, with and without private goods,
is for the public good to be located at 100 with total payoffs net of private goods equal to 1499.
The parameterization of the model employed was chosen with two primary objectives in
mind. First, we wanted an environment in which the inclusion of private goods was predicted to
result in a high frequency of “strange bedfellow” coalitions, coalitions that exclude the median
legislator. In addition to making the obvious point regarding the existence of such coalitions,
proposers (T3s) would be required to provide higher payoffs to their coalition partners than
themselves, which might be hard for a number of subjects to deal with. Second, we wanted the
SSPE to be a pure strategy equilibrium since past experimental research makes it clear that
mixing is difficult to achieve in practice.
Table 1
Public Good Location and Private Good Allocations as a Function of Proposer’s Type
(under the SSPE)
Proposer
T1
T2
T3
Location
16.33
49.67
83
Private Good
All to T1
All to T2
All to T1
Allocation
Partner’s Type
T2
T3
T1
Proposer’s Payoff
684
650
498
Partner’s Payoff
550
298
617
δ = 1; Coalition partners receive their continuation value for the game.
Experimental sessions consisted of 15 bargaining rounds, with between 12 and 15
subjects in each experimental session. Subjects’ designation as a T1, T2 or T3 was randomly
determined at the start of an experimental session and remained the same throughout the session.
Each bargaining round consisted of one or more stages. In each stage all subjects submitted
proposals after which one was selected at random to be voted on. If the proposal failed to receive
a majority of votes, a new stage began with a new set of proposals solicited, with this process
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repeating itself until an allocation was passed.7 Each bargaining round continued until all
groups had achieved an allocation, with those bargaining groups who finished early, looking at a
“please wait” screen until the remaining group(s) finished. At the end of each bargaining round
subjects were randomly re-matched, with new bargaining groups formed (subject to the
constraint of a single Ti of each type). One round, selected at random, was paid off on at the end
of the session. Experimental sessions typically lasted for between an hour and an hour and a half.
Software for conducting the experiment was programmed using zTree (Fishbacher, 2007).
Instructions were read out loud with each subject having a copy to follow along with.8
The key programming task was to make sure subjects were aware of the opportunity cost for
deviations from their ideal points. This was done through a computer graphic showing the
proposed location being voted on along with the deviation from a given player’s ideal point and
the total walking cost.9
Each experimental session started with an initial dry run in which subjects were walked
through the computer interface to understand the rules of the game and what the software looked
like when a proposal was rejected and when it was accepted. Sessions with private goods began
with two dry runs with no private goods. Subjects were told “Please treat the dry runs seriously
as the experience should help you when we start to play for cash.”
Subjects were recruited via e-mail solicitation from the 5000 or so undergraduates
enrolled in economics classes for the quarter in which sessions were conducted, as well as the
previous quarter. All subjects had no prior experience with the game in question or other
multilateral bargaining experiments. Each subject was paid a $6 show up fee along with their
earnings from the bargaining selected for payment, with ECUs converted to dollars at 1 ECU = 3
cents. Earnings averaged between $20-22 per person including the $6 show up fee.
Three sessions of the public good only (baseline) treatment were conducted along with
three sessions of the public and private good treatment, with a total of 42 and 39 subjects in the
baseline and private goods treatments, respectively. We did not conduct games with only private
goods as there have been extensive experimental studies with parameter values very similar to

7

The software was designed to permit up to 15 stages of bargaining before the program moved onto a new
bargaining round. All bargaining rounds ended well before 15 stages.
8
9

A full set of instructions can be found at http://www.econ.ohio-state.edu/kagel/CGK_leg_barg/instructions.pdf
See Figure 1 of the Instructions appendix.

9

the ones employed here.10 Results will be summarized periodically in the form of a number of
conclusions.
4. Experimental Results
Unless otherwise stated, in what follows outcomes are reported for bargaining rounds 715, after subjects had gained some experience with the structure of the game as well as the
software. Results are reasonably similar, but with somewhat more noise, if including all periods.
The analysis begins with aggregate outcomes.
4.1 Aggregate Outcomes: Table 2 shows a significant shift in the location of the public good in
response to the introduction of private goods. This is true using a t-test treating each bargaining
round as an independent observation (p < 0.01) or a Mann-Whitney test using session level
averages as the unit of observation (p < 0.05).11 The variance around the mean value of the
public good also increases significantly with the introduction of private goods.12 Even though
with only public goods the variance is much greater than predicted under the SSPE (it should be
zero), the mean location of the public good is quite close to what is predicted (38.8 versus 33).
Further, with public and private goods the mean location of the public good is essentially at the
level predicted (49.8 versus the predicted outcome of 49.7), with the variance quite close to its
predicted value as well (858.5 versus 740.7).
Table 2
Aggregate Outcomesa
Average
Percentage of
Location
Proposals Accepted
(standard errors)
in Stage 1
No
With
No
With
Private Private Private
Private
38.8
76.9%
49.8
63.3%
(20.3) (29.3)
[33]
[100%]
[49.7] [100%]
a

Total Payoffs
No
Private
1350

With
Private
1483

[1365]

[1465]

Predicted outcomes in bold in brackets.

10

Namely infinite horizon three player games with δ = 1.0, with the same subject population (see Fréchette et al.,
2005 a, b for details beyond the results reported in Section 1 above).
11
The t-test results hold with both equal and unequal variances between the two sample populations.
12
Unless otherwise stated, all statistical tests reported in the text are significant under a Mann-Whitney test at the
5% level using session level data and at the 1% level using a t-test treating each bargaining round as an independent
observation.
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Proposals are far from always being accepted in stage 1,b ut rejection rates are
comparable to those reported in other BF type bargaining experiments.13 With only public goods
T1s and T3s offer locations that are typically quite far away from 33, with a number of these
offers being accepted. With private goods, as will be shown below, winning coalitions are
formed and proposals passed that differ from the SSPE on a number of dimensions. Finally,
stage 1 acceptance rates are significantly higher with private goods present than without.
Although this is not predicted in the theory, it is consistent with the notion that legislative
compromise is easier with private payoffs available to grease the wheels.14
Total payoffs are somewhat lower than predicted absent private goods, and somewhat
higher than predicted with private goods present. The net effect is a statistically significant
increase in total payoffs with private goods present, net of the cost of the private goods (an
average increase of 33 ECUs). As such, the introduction of private goods, aka “pork” is, in this
case, welfare enhancing in terms of increasing total payoffs. This is not to say that the presence
of private goods will always be welfare enhancing, as this depends critically on the relative value
of the public good for different constituencies as well as how the distribution of private goods
affects the policy chosen. But the present results demonstrate that there clearly are cases where
“pork” is welfare enhancing.
Conclusion 1: Aggregate outcomes are qualitatively similar to those predicted in that (i) the
mean outcome for the public good shifts significantly in the direction predicted with private
goods present, and (ii) the variance around the mean location of the public good is significantly
greater with private goods available. Introducing private goods increases total welfare above
and beyond the cost of the private goods, with stage 1 acceptance rates increasing as well.
4.2 Behavior by Types: Table 3 shows the average stage 1 proposed location for the public good
by player type for games with no private goods, along with the “pass rate” – the percentage of
type Ti’s proposals voted on that were passed. Accepted proposals are included regardless of the
stage in which they were accepted. Payoffs from accepted proposals for different types are
shown in the right hand most columns of Table 3 along with predicted payoffs, so that reading
across a row gives outcomes for a given proposer type: For example, T1s’ average proposed
13

For example in the three person divide the dollar games reported in Fréchette et al. (2005a) in which players had
equal bargaining weight and equal probability of being the proposer, 65-67% of all bargaining rounds ended in stage
1 for inexperienced subjects.
14
The value of earmarks and pork barrel spending to forge legislative compromise, often generating improvements
in overall social benefits, is well recognized in the literature (see, for example, Evans, 2004; Cuéllar, 2012).

11

location for the public good in stage 1 was 26.8, with an average location for accepted proposals
of 29.0. These accepted locations resulted in an average payoff to T1s of 571, to T2s of 561 and
to T3s of 174. The bottom row, Average Overall Payoffs, gives payoffs averaged across all
accepted allocations.
Table 3
Proposed Public Good Location by Player Type: Public Good Only Treatment
(standard error of the mean in parentheses)a
Average Payoffs for Accepted
Average Location
Proposalsc
Proposer’s
Pass
[predicted payoffs]
Type
Rateb
Predicted Proposed Accepted
T1
T2
T3
in stage 1
T1
33
26.8
29.0
50.0%
561
174
571
(3.6)
(4.3)
[600]
[198]
[567]
T2
33
33.9
33.2
62.2%
567
199
575
(3.5)
(3.6)
[567]
[198]
[600]
T3
33
67.6
61.5
38.3%
539
515
369
(4.0)
(4.8)
[567]
[600]
[198]
233.0
555.4
561.2
Average
(10.9)
(4.0)
(1.8)
Overall
[198]
[600]
[567]
Payoffs
a

Using subject averages as the unit of observation.
Percent of Ti’s proposals voted on that were passed.
c
Proposers’ payoffs in bold.
b

Looking at the proposed location for the public good it is quite clear that except for T2s,
proposers typically propose something closer to their ideal location than the predicted location of
33. Figure 2 presents histograms of stage 1 proposals. The left hand side of the vertical axis
shows the frequency with which proposed public good locations were chosen, with the pass rates
for these proposals shown on the right hand side vertical axis. Proposals have been bunched into
bins of [0, 5), [5, 10), etc. There are very few proposals by T1s and T3s that are within ± 5 of 33.
For T1 and T3, those proposals that are close to 33 always pass, with the acceptance rate falling
off as proposals move away from 33, so that the rejection of T1 and T3 proposals is due to
pulling the public good location away from the median voter’s value (33). At the same time T2’s
rejection rates go up as they make proposals closer to their ideal point.

12

Figure 2
Histograms of Chosen Proposals by Type with Pass Rates:
Public Good Only Treatment (Stage 1 only)

Contrary to the SSPE, there is at least modest proposer power present for all three types
in that each of them obtains their highest average payoff when proposing. In this respect T3s
have the strongest proposer power, which is only partially offset by their much lower acceptance
rates compared to T1s and T2s.15 To rank relative proposer power we calculate expected payoffs
to the different types in their role as proposers and compare it to what is predicted under the
SSPE.16 T3s averaged 144% of what is predicted under the SSPE compared to 100% and 95%
15

Fréchette, Kagel, and Morelli (2005c) also identify proposer power where it is not predicted under the
SSPE in legislative bargaining games.
16
The expected payoff is a proposer’s average payoff in accepted allocations multiplied by the average acceptance
rate plus their empirically determined continuation value of the game multiplied by the average rejection rate.
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for T1s and T2s, respectively.17 T1s wind up with essentially the same average overall payoffs as
T2s as they get a little more than predicted on average as proposers, and T2s have a higher unit
cost to the deviations from their ideal point.
Proposals typically passed with what essentially amounted to minimum winning
coalitions (MWCs) as winning proposals averaged 1.2 votes (in addition to the proposer’s vote),
with minimal variation across proposer types. Winning coalitions are what one would expect
based on players’ self-interest with T2s most often voting in favor of T1s proposals (87%), T1s
typically siding with T2s (74%) and T2s typically siding with T3s (65%).
The failure of all proposals passed to be within a couple of ECUs from the median voter’s
value (33) can potentially be attributed to impatience on the part of subjects. Even though δ = 1,
it is possible that T2s are willing to accept something short of their ideal point simply to get the
bargaining round over with. However, it is clear that impatience cannot provide a full
explanation for the failure to achieve T2’s ideal point. Although an impatient T2 would allow
T1 and T3 proposers to pull the policy location closer to their respective ideal points, if T2 voters
are impatient we would expect the same to be true of T1s and T3s. As such T2s should be able
to consistently propose and pass a policy location of 33. But Figure 2 shows that T2s proposing
policies between 30 and 35 get their proposals passed less than 40% of the time. Further
evidence that impatience cannot provide a full explanation for the failure to achieve T2’s ideal
point comes from ultimatum game experiments, where impatience plays no role, yet there are
consistent failures to achieve anything approaching the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
Finally, to the extent that impatience plays a role here, we would expect it to play a comparable
role when private goods are available. As such the comparative static predictions of the model,
which is what we are primarily interested in, should be preserved going between games with and
without private goods.

Conclusion 2: The relatively large variance around the predicted location of 33 with public
goods results from T1s and T3s proposing locations closer to their ideal points with many of
these proposals accepted. MWCs tend to form based on voters’ self-interest, with the vast
majority of proposals passing with one other vote in addition to the proposer.

17

Note that T2s’ predicted payoff (600) is the maximum payoff possible in the game, while T3s’ predicted payoff is
substantially below this. As a result, T3s have much more room for improving their predicted payoff.
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Average
Location
Proposer’s
Type
T1

T2

T3

Table 4
Accepted Proposals in Games with Private Goods:
Location, Private Good Allocations and Payoffs
(standard error of the mean in parentheses)a, b
Average Private
Pass Ratec
Average Payoffs for Accepted
Good Alocations
Proposalsd

T1
36.4
(4.9)
[16.33]
34.0
(3.5)
[49.67]
88.2
(3.0)
[83.0]

T2

63.1
35.5
(4.8) (4.8)
[100]
[0]
48.4
44.1
(4.5) (3.1)
[0]
[100]
71.2
21.7
(12.8) (11.3)
[100]
[0]

T3
1.4
(1.3)
[0]
7.6
(4.3)
[0]
7.2
(4.7)
[0]

T1

T2

T3

81.0%

626.7

596.2

219.8

[100%]
79.6%

[684]
614.4

[550]
620.1

[98]
211.3

[100%]
61.4%

[550]
582.9

[650]
456.0

[298]
536.6

[617]
613.2
(2.9)
[617.0]

[450]
566.1
(8.3)
[550.0]

[498]
303.5
(16.5)
[298.0]

[100%]
Average
Overall
Payoffs
a
Using subject averages as the unit of observation.
b
Predicted values in brackets in bold.
c
Percent of Ti’s proposals voted on that were passed.
d
Proposers’ payoffs in bold.

Table 4 is the counterpart to Table 3 for games with private goods. Space considerations
limit reporting to average accepted public good locations along with the corresponding private
good allocations.18 Table 5 compares outcomes for accepted proposals directly between games
with and without private goods.

18

Average stage 1 proposals, which are reasonably close to accepted proposals, are available on request.
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Table 5
Comparison of Accepted Proposals in Games with and without Private Goodsc
Pass Rate
Avg Payoffsd
Type Avg Location
T1
T2
T3
NoPrv Prv NoPrv
Prv
NoP Prv NoPrv Prv NoPrv Prv
rv
b
a
T1
29.0 36.4
50.0% 81.0%
571 627
561
596
174
220
T2
T3

33.2
61.5

34.0
88.2

a

62.2%

79.6% b

567

614

575

620

199

211

38.3%

b

539

583

515

456

369

537

61.4%

a

Difference between private and no private outcomes is significantly different from 0
at better than the 0.01 level using a t-test with unequal variances and treating each
accepted proposal as a unit of observation.19
b
Difference between private and no private outcomes is significantly different from 0
at better than the 0.05 level using a t-test with unequal variances and treating each
accepted proposal as a unit of observation.
c
Using subject averages as the unit of observation.
d
We do not examine the statistical significance of differences in payoffs since the
game with private goods has an additional 100 ECUs available.
Table 5 shows that pass rates are substantially higher with private goods than without for
all proposer types, consistent with the fundamental idea that private goods help to achieve
compromise on policy issues. Note that the theory is silent on this point as it predicts that all
stage 1 proposals are accepted with or without private goods. Nevertheless, the ability of private
goods to help forge legislative compromise is a well known factor in the political economy
literature (see, Evans, 2004, for example).
Table 4 shows that conditional on their proposal being accepted, all three types have
proposer power in the sense that they obtain at least modestly higher payoffs when proposing
than when they are not proposing. Using expected payoffs to rank relative proposer power, T3s
have the least power relative to what is predicted under the SSPE, 89.7%, with T1s and T2s
getting 91.2% and 96.3% of their predicted payoffs, respectively.20
Table 6 shows voting patterns for accepted proposals by proposer type. This in
conjunction with Table 4 provides clear evidence as to the types of coalitions formed with
private payoffs available. First, proposals rarely pass with more than the vote of the proposer and
19
20

Results are similar using a Mann-Whitney test.
See footnote 16 above for details on calculating expected payoffs.
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one other player (averaging 1.05 votes in addition to the proposer’s vote), which is even less
often than with only public goods (the latter averaged 1.20 votes in addition to the proposer’s
vote). As predicted T3s are largely forming coalitions with T1s (85% of the time), allocating
most of the private goods to them and proposing a public good location that is reasonably close
to the predicted location of 83. The advantage to T3s of using private goods to try and get a
more favorable public good location for themselves was reasonably obvious with 8 out of 13 T3s
essentially allocating all the private goods to T1s (over 99 ECUs on average).21 But T3
proposers also had to offer higher payoffs to T1s than to themselves as predicted by the theory.
Of T3 proposals that pass only with the vote of a T1, T3s’ payoffs were 32 ECUs lower on
average than T1s payoffs. The remainder of the T3s either kept a significant portion of private
goods for themselves and/or allocated a significant portion to T2s.22
Table 6
Percentage of Accepted Proposals Approved by Voter Type in Games with Private Goods
T1 only
T2 only
T3 only
Both
(all
other
stages)Proposer
voters
T1
-21%
4%
74%
T2
84%
-5%
12%
T3
7%
-7%
85%
Predicted coalition partners under the SSPE are in bold.
Contrary to the SSPE prediction, T2s primarily formed coalitions with T1s (84% of the
time), with only 3 out of 13 proposing an average location greater than 36, compared to 4
proposing average locations less than 30.23 The SSPE prediction that T2s will form coalitions
with T3s is reasonably subtle as it essentially rests on the fact that T1s can demand relatively
large payoffs unless T2s form coalitions with T3s. However, T1s do not demand significantly
higher payoffs, with the near equal splits T2s offer T1s being readily accepted. Note that T2s
21

Proposed allocations are calculated over all stage 1 proposals for bargaining rounds 7-15.
Three out of 13 kept more than 1 ECU on average for themselves (averaging 77.8, 33.1, and 23.2 ECUs
respectively), with 4 offering larger private good allocations to T2s than to T1s (averaging 77.8, 55.6, 38.3 and 8.9
ECUs respectively; 2 out of these 4 were among the three keeping more than 1 ECU on average for themselves).
23
Of those T2s proposing allocations greater than 36, one proposed locations in the 80s in the last 4 bargaining
rounds generating a close to equal split among all three players, one might have still been learning proposing in the
30s over the last 6 bargaining rounds, with the third showing no consistency proposing in the range 21-85 over
bargaining rounds 7-15.

22
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earned very close to what they would have gotten under the SSPE (630 on average for proposals
that pass with only T1’s vote versus 650 under the SSPE24), while also having their proposals
accepted with a very high frequency. With so few proposals actually made by T2s to T3s we can
only speculate what it would have taken for T2s to form successful coalitions with T3s. This no
doubt would have required a public good location far above 33 to get T3s vote, which would
have reduced T2s earnings substantially compared to what they got partnering with T1s.25 T1s
primarily formed coalitions with T2s (74% of the time), with 9 out of 13 T1s’ average stage one
proposals yielding payoffs that were within plus or minus 20 ECUs of T2s payoffs. These
proposals involved sharply lower payoffs for T3s (350 ECUs more to T1 than to T3).26
Conclusion 3: All proposers’ acceptance rates are substantially higher with private goods
available to “grease the wheels,” consistent with the fundamental notion that private goods help
to achieve legislative compromise. Comparing actual to expected payoffs, T2s have the greatest
proposer power relative to what the SSPE predicts, followed by T1s and T3s. T3s largely form
coalitions with T1s, as predicted. However, T2s form winning coalitions with T1s, contrary to
what the SSPE predicts.
4.3 Voting patterns
Table 7
Voting Probits with Private Goods Available
(Rounds 7-15)
T1 Vote = -60.3 + 0.094 T2 + 0.017 T3 + 0.020 T2T3 - 0.004 T3T2 + 52.598 DT3
(20.4)a (0.031)a (0.010)c
(0.009)b
(0.006)
(21.5)b
T2 Vote = -20.8 + 0.036 T1 + 0.037 T3 + 0.002 T1T3 - 0.004 T3T1 + 2.999 DT3
(8.2)b (0.013)a (0.023)c
(0.004)
(0.022)
(20.0)
T3 Vote = -0.95 - 0.001 T1 + 0.012 T2 - 0.026 T1T2 - 0.006 T2T1 + 15.102 DT1
(16.76) (0.006)
(0.010) (0.018)
(0.024)
(19.3)
24

This differs from the overall average payoff for T2 proposers reported in Table 4 since it conditions on proposals
which only received T1’s vote.
25
The earnings differential between T2s and T3s under the SSPE is far in excess of any of differences in payoffs
between coalition partners reported in the data.
26
Average payoffs for these 9 were 626.7, 619.5, and 181.2 for T1, T2, and T3, respectively. The remaining 4 T1s
were uniformly more generous to T3s than the SSPE prediction, while consistently taking less than predicted for
themselves, with average proposed payoffs of 624.1, 526.4, and 333.8 to T1, T2, and T3 respectively.
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a

Significantly different from 0 at better than the 0.01 level, two-tailed test.
Significantly different from 0 at better than the 0.05 level, two-tailed test.
c
Significantly different from 0 at better than the 0.10 level, two-tailed test.

b

Dependent variable is 1 if vote in favor of proposal; 0 otherwise.
Explanatory variables: Ti = payoff proposed by player Ti to responder in question; TiTj = payoff
proposed by Ti to other player, Tj, as part of the proposal to responder in question; DTi =
dummy variable equal to 1 for proposer of type Ti, 0 otherwise.
Table 7 reports random effect probits (with a subject random effect) for voting by the
different player types with private goods available. The dependent variable is 1 for a yes vote; 0
otherwise. Rather than treat the public payoffs and private payoffs as separate explanatory
variables we adopt a reduced form approach with own payoffs as right hand side variables
distinguishing between who the proposer is (in case there is resentment towards different
proposer types on account of unequal payoffs), as well as payoffs of proposers to other players
(to account for possible other regarding preferences).27 For example, the first probit reported is
for how T1s’ voted with the following RHS variables: T2’s proposed payoff to T1 when T2’s
proposal was voted on, T3’s proposed payoff to T1 when T3’s proposal was voted on, T2’s
proposed payoff to T3 when T2’s proposal was voted on (T2T3), T3’s proposed payoff to T2
when T3’s proposal was voted on (T3T2), with a dummy variable that takes value 1 when T3 is
the proposer, and 0 when T2 is the proposer.28 Preliminary probits with voting stage included as
an explanatory variable failed to identify a significant stage effect (p > 0.10 in all cases) with
little impact on the other coefficient values with stage removed, and are not reported here.
Own payoffs are positive and significantly different from zero at better than the 10%
level in all cases. The sole exception to this is T3s’ voting in response to own payoffs which are
not significant at conventional levels. This probably reflects the infrequency with which T1s and
T2s offered any sizable share to T3s. T2s are “color” blind when voting with respect to the
proposer’s type, as we cannot reject a null hypothesis of equal responsiveness to own share
27

We also ran regressions like those reported in Table 7 breaking out payoffs from private and public goods, testing
for any differences in coefficient values. In no case could we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients were
equal. While the reduced form is applicable here, the idea that these two are perfect substitutes in field settings may
well not be the case. We also ran (subject) fixed effect regressions with very similar results.
28
The DT3 dummy is included to account for any potential fixed differential responsiveness T1s might employ in
determining whether to vote for or against T1s’ proposals. The DT3 and DT1 dummies in T2 and T3’s voting
regressions play the same role there as well.
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regardless of the proposer’s type, and the DT3 dummy is not significantly different from zero as
well. The situation is more complicated for T1 voters who, other things equal are more likely to
accept a proposal from a T3 (the DT3 dummy is significant at the 5% level), but for whom a
two-tailed t-test rejects the null hypothesis that they are equally responsive to changes in own
payoffs from T2 and T3 proposers. Instead, they are more responsive to payoffs from T2
proposers. T1 voters also appear to favor T2 proposals that target higher payoffs to T3s (the
significant positive coefficient value for T2T3). None of the remaining variables in the probits
achieve statistical significance at anything approaching conventional levels.
The probits can be used to calculate the expected payoff maximizing proposal for each
type, as well as the expected payoff from the SSPE proposal, and the “efficient equal split” (the
payoff maximizing proposal that equalizes payoffs to within 1 ECU between the proposer and
one other coalition partner). These are reported in Table 8 along with the average expected
return by types when proposing.29,30 Several things stand out in the data. First, the payoff
maximizing proposal is greater than the SSPE proposal in all cases. This results from the
relatively high rejection rates that the very unequal splits under the SSPE generate. Second, the
efficient equal split also yields a higher expected payoff than the SSPE for all types, but a lower
expected return than the payoff maximizing proposal (although not so much lower that
proposers’ are giving up large sums of money). Third, for T2s both the payoff maximizing
proposal and the efficient equal split involve partnering with T1s, not T3s as the SSPE requires,
yielding substantially higher payoffs than the SSPE in both cases. Finally, in terms of looking for
an efficient equal split it is a relative no-brainer for T3s to partner with T1s rather than T2s as
T3s would earn 534 under an efficient equal split T2s versus 600 with T1s, while also providing
T1s with a higher payoff thereby promoting greater acceptance rates.31
29

The expected payoff of an offer depends on the probability one or both of the other players accept the proposal,
the proposer’s type, and the experimental continuation value for the game should the proposal be defeated. The
latter is a type’s average payoff in the game weighted by the frequency of acceptance for each type of proposer.
The experimental continuation values are 613, 566, and 304 for T1, T2, and T3, respectively.
30
In calculating the payoff maximizing proposal for T1s, along with the expected returns from the SSPE proposal
and the efficient equal split, we restricted the T1T2 coefficient value to zero in the T3 voter regression since (i) the
coefficient value is not significantly different from zero and (ii) without this restriction the payoff maximizing
proposal has T1s propose Y=0 and PT1=100. This occurs because the probability T3 accepts increases as T2’s
payoff declines if T1T2 is included, but the proposal yields a payoff to T3s of 0, with 700 for T1s. It is totally
implausible that T3s would vote for such proposals, so that extrapolation of the probits in this case is unreasonable.
This is empirically supported by the fact that in only 2 out of 41 cases T3s voted in favor of a T1 proposal which
gave them a payoff of 200 or less.
31
It’s also a relative no-brainer for T2s to pursue efficient equal splits with T1s rather than T3s.
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Table 8
Comparison of Expected Return to Proposer’s Payoff Maximizing Proposal with Other Offers in
Games with Private Goods
(standard error of the mean in parentheses)a
Expected Return to Proposer from
Proposer’s
Type

Payoff
Maximizing
Proposal

Efficient Equal
Splitb

SSPE

T1

660.4

633.8

627.3

T2

645.8

633.9

587.4

T3

543.8

543.8

465.4

Average Expected
Returnc
625.5
(2.97)
615.9
(6.36)
473.1
(16.37)

a

Using subject averages as the unit of observation.
The payoff maximizing proposal that equalizes payoffs (within 1 ECU) between the proposer
and one other coalition partner. The efficient splits are:
T1 Proposer: Y=33, PT1=67, PT2=33, PT3=0
T2 Proposer: Y=33, PT1=66, PT2=34, PT3=0
T3 Proposer: Y=100, PT1=100, PT2=0, PT3=0,
where PTi = private goods to Ti.
c
Using subject averages as the unit of observation. Considers all proposals voted on.

b

Figure 3
Histogram of Expected Payoffs to Proposera

SSPE EES

SSPE

MAX

Type 1 Proposer

Type 2 Proposer
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EES

MAX

SSPE

EES MAX

Type 3 Proposer
a

Rounds 7-15 all proposals voted on.
Expected returns from the SSPE, the efficient equal split (EES), and the payoff maximizing
proposal (Max) are noted in all cases. For T3 EES=Max.
Looking at average expected returns based on the data, all types earn less than the payoff
maximizing proposal, with T1s and T2s earning close to the efficient equal split, and T3s earning
substantially less than the efficient equal split. Figure 3 provides histograms of each type’s
expected payoff from proposals voted on. For all types these are clustered around the efficient
equal split. However, T3s have a long tail of proposals with expected returns well below the
expected return from the efficient equal split as a result of lower acceptance rates and payoffs
that rapidly decline as the policy location moves away from 100, so that on average they earn
lower expected returns. These proposals largely consist of T3s either keeping some of the
private goods for themselves while also proposing locations close to their preferred point, or
proposals allocating private goods to one of the other players with locations lower than 100. Both
types of proposals entail lower expected payoffs than the efficient equal split: the former
proposals entail high payoffs to the proposer but are unlikely to pass, while the latter proposals
frequently pass but with lower payoffs to the proposer.
One question is why proposers (particularly T1s and T2s) fail to achieve the payoff
maximizing outcome, going for the efficient equal split instead. We argue that the efficient
equal split, or something very close to it, provides an obvious focal point with a very high
probability of being accepted and with payoffs that are reasonably close to the payoff
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maximizing proposal.32 In contrast, the payoff maximizing proposal requires more
comprehensive information than players would be likely to have and would entail somewhat
greater risk of rejection. Given the greater risk of rejection it is tempting to argue that, in going
for the efficient equal split, T1s and T2s are risk averse. However, this is an awkward argument
to make as in the pure public goods case, risk aversion on the part of T1s and T2s implies
accepting less than the amount offered under the SSPE (see Harrington, 1990 and Montero,
2007). So that T2s should find proposals at their ideal points readily accepted, which they are
not.33
Conclusion 4: With public and private goods both the payoff maximizing proposal and the
efficient equal split offer higher expected returns than the SSPE for all types, with offers
clustered at, or very close to, the efficient equal split. Risk aversion fails to provide a plausible
explanation for favoring the efficient equal split over the payoff maximizing proposal as it fails
to explain why T2s lack the predicted level of proposer power in the pure public good treatment.
We conjecture that the efficient equal split is attractive as a focal point with reasonably high
expected own payoffs and a high probability of acceptance.
The experimental treatment reported in the appendix has quite similar results to the one
reported on here. The major exception is that the largest difference between the expected payoff
from the efficient equal split and the payoff maximizing proposal there is almost 50% greater
than the largest difference here (38 ECUs versus 26 ECUs). Thus, there is substantially more
incentive for proposers (T2s in that case) to go with the payoff maximizing proposal as opposed
to the efficient equal split. Thirty-five percent (35%) of T2s’ proposals which are voted on in
that treatment lie above the efficient equal split but below the payoff maximizing proposal. This
is substantially larger than the percentage of all proposals in that interval in the current treatment
(12.1%, 9.3%, and 0.0% for T1s, T2s, and T3s, respectively). Results from the alternative set of
treatment values are discussed in detail in the appendix.

32

For T1 and T2 players looking to maximize coalition payoffs and to distribute payoffs equally between each other,
the efficient equal split is easy to find. Once a subject realizes that the public good location should be at 33 (since T2
cares more about this dimension), it is straightforward to find the distribution of private goods which makes their
payoffs approximately equal.
33
We are grateful to a referee for considerably simplifying our argument on this point.
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4.4 Political party formation: JM extend the legislative bargaining model to show that if
legislators were to get together before the game and form binding agreements to cooperate with
each other (“political parties”), they could strictly improve their individual outcomes over what
they would expect to get absent such a binding agreement. Political parties are able to increase a
player’s surplus since there is a positive probability that a player will be excluded from the
“winning” legislative coalition in the bargaining game. By coordinating their actions players can
guarantee being included in the winning coalition. JM do not model the commitment process but
assume that members act as one player in the legislative game, committing to follow the same
single action when recognized, and to approve each other’s proposals.34
We do not directly address the issue of party formation experimentally as this is well
beyond the scope of the present paper and, in any event, appears to be inordinately difficult to
implement experimentally. However, the implications of our experimental results for what
would constitute stable political parties can be readily calculated. JM assume that the surplus
generated by a party will be split according to the Nash bargaining solution. A political party is
stable if neither member can do better by withdrawing and forming a party with another player.
Under the SSPE, the only stable parties involve a coalition between T1 and T2 and between T2
and T3.
However, computing continuation values based on the empirical continuation values
reported in Table 4, there is only a single stable political party, the one between T1 and T2. This
is true whether the Nash bargaining solution is used to split the increased benefits (as in JM), or
the efficient equal split is used. Table 9 shows the binding agreements that could be reached
between players using both the SSPE continuation values and the empirical continuation values
from Table 4 assuming the Nash bargaining solution for determining inter-party payoffs. A party
comprised of T1 and T2 is stable using both the empirical and SSPE continuation values. T2 and
T3 is stable under the SSPE continuation value, but is not stable under the empirical continuation
value, as T3 can do better partnering with T1. T3-T1 is not stable under both continuation values
since in both cases T1 is better off partnering with T2.
Table 9
Political Party Agreements and Payoffs
7a Predicted Outcomes
34

JM note that the commitment would require some repeated interaction in a context that would allow for rewards
and punishment (“taking one for the team” as a recent candidate for President has noted in the primaries).
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Political Party

Location

Casha

Political Party Payoffsb
[Continuation Value]

T1-T2

33

100,0,0

T2-T3

66

0,100,0

T3-T1

66

100,0,0

T1 = 667
[616]
T2 = 600
[550]
T3 = 398
[298]

T2 = 600
[550]
T3 = 398
[298]
T1 = 634
[616]

7b Experimental Outcomes
Political Party

Location

Casha

Political Party Payoffsc
[Experimental Continuation Value]

T1-T2

33

90,10,0

T2-T3

64

0,100,0

T3-T1

69

100,0,0

T1 = 657
[613]
T2 = 607
[566]
T3 = 412
[304]

T2 = 610
[566]
T3 = 385
[304]
T1 = 631
[613]

a

Cash allocation x,y,z is cash to T1, T2, and T3, respectively.
Based on the SSPE continuation values and the Nash bargaining solution.
c
Based on the empirical continuation value and the Nash bargaining solution.
Payoffs and locations are rounded to the nearest integer.
b

Similar results are obtained using the efficient equal split as the basis for determining
inter-party payoffs: T1 partnering with T2 yields a payoff of 633 to both players, with lower
payoffs to T1 for partnering with T3 (600) and for T2 partnering with T3 (533). The efficient
equal split is, arguably, the relevant reference point for determining what constitute stable
political parties here since it has more drawing power in terms of how players bargain in the
experiment than the Nash bargaining solution has, which can generate rather unequal inter-party
payoffs. Finally, note that the formation of strong political parties would eliminate strange
bedfellow coalitions, except in those cases where party leadership allows members to vote their
conscience.
Conclusion 5: Using the SSPE continuation values and Nash bargaining for determining interparty payoffs, there are two possibilities for stable political parties – T1 in partnership with T2
or T2 in partnership with T3. However, using the empirical continuation values from the
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experiment, the only stable political party is the one between T1 and T2. Using the efficient
equal split in place of the Nash bargaining solution for determining inter-party payoffs yields the
same conclusion, that the only stable political party is the one between T1 and T2.
5. Summary and Discussion
We report results from a legislative bargaining experiment based on Jackson and
Moselle’s (2002) model in which players bargain over a single policy dimension along with the
distribution of private goods across legislative constituencies. We compare play in a baseline
treatment with only public goods to games with private goods available to help secure
compromise. We report a number of outcomes each of which are discussed below.
In the implementation reported on here, total welfare (total payoffs) is predicted to
remain constant with and without private goods (net of the cost of the private goods). However,
contrary to this, total welfare increased with private goods available, and this occurred uniformly
across experimental sessions.35 Hence, not only did private goods grease the wheels in terms of
securing more timely passage of proposed allocations, they also improved total welfare. This is
not to say this will always happen but that private goods need not always be bad. Additional
reservations need to be added to this result in efforts to extend it beyond the lab. In the
experiment private goods are delivered directly to agents, whereas in field settings private goods
allocated to legislative districts can take the form of inefficient local public goods; e.g., the
bridge to nowhere in Alaska. This tends to dilute the benefits obtained from the private good,
thereby offsetting, to some extent at least, whatever welfare gains that might result from private
goods.36
Regarding total welfare levels reported versus those predicted, total payoffs were less
than predicted in the public good only treatment and greater than predicted with private goods.
The reason for these deviations can be found in the asymmetric payoffs for deviations from the
average public good location in conjunction with the variability in outcomes across different
bargaining rounds. The welfare maximizing outcome for the location of the public good is 100,
so it always increases total welfare to move policy to the right of the predicted outcome.
However, given the costs to deviating, all rightward movements of policy are not equal. The
marginal benefit of a rightward shift when the public good location is less than 33 is four times
35

Further, as in the parallel treatment reported in the Appendix, welfare increased more than predicted with public
and private goods compared to only public goods.
36
We are grateful to Guillaume Fréchette for pointing this out.
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the marginal benefit than when its greater than 33 (8 versus 2) as the shift helps both the T2 and
T3 players in the first case and helps only the T3 play in the second case. This explains why
welfare falls in the public good only treatment even though the average public good location is to
the right of 33 (38.8): 53% of accepted proposals lie below 33 with an average location of 23.8,
while 40% of proposals lie above 33 with an average of location of 60.5. That is, given these
asymmetric welfare effects around 33, policies passed to the right of 33 do not occur often
enough and/or are not sufficiently to the right of 33 for welfare to reach the predicted level.
This asymmetry in welfare effects for deviations from the predicted public good location
also explains why welfare is greater than predicted in the private good treatment even though the
average accepted policy outcome is almost identical to the average predicted policy. With
private goods the average location for the public good with T1s as proposers is 36.4 (with
minimal variance around this outcome) versus the predicted location of 16.33, with this
difference generating a strong positive welfare effect. So while T2’s average policy location is
34 versus the predicted location of 49.67, it does not usually go below 33 (and when it does, it
does not drop below 33 by very much), so that given the asymmetry in payoffs this has a smaller
negative impact on total payoffs than the positive effect of the rightward shift in location
generated by T1s. Finally, T3 proposers’ average accepted policy location is a bit above the
predicted level (88.2 versus 83), which also provides a modest bump to overall welfare.
The public good only treatment achieved, on average, close to the predicted public good
location but with a relatively large variance around that location as opposed to the zero variance
predicted. This large variance was generated by T1s and T3s consistently proposing a public
good location more favorable to their own payoffs than to the median voter (T2), with substantial
numbers of these proposals being accepted. Further, as already noted, acceptances were not due
to odd coalitions in which T3s voted in favor of T1s proposals that favor T1s, and vice versa.
Two points are worth discussing with respect to this result. First, there is a series of earlier
experiments dealing with public good/locational issues similar to the present study but done in a
very different context and with quite different outcomes. These earlier studies typically involved
unstructured, face-to-face, bargaining using Robert’s rules of order, designed to investigate the
drawing power of the core (see Palfrey, 2012 for a survey of the relevant research). A fair
summary of these results is that the core represents a fairly good predictor under a number of
conditions, but when the core is present and differs from the “fair” outcome where all players
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receive decent positive payoffs, the fair outcome attracts more attention than the core (Eavey and
Miller, 1984). Although we find “fair” outcomes within what are effectively MWCs (e.g., much
more equal splits between T1s and T2s than predicted) there is typically little concern for the
third player, with T3s achieving distinctly lower average payoffs than T1s and T2s in the public
good treatment. The factors most likely responsible for this difference from the earlier research
are (i) the much more structured nature of the bargaining process under the Baron-Ferejohn rules
employed here which tends to promote MWCs and (ii) the fact that bargaining is done
anonymously here which tends to promote more unequal splits (see, for example, Roth, 1995).37
Predictions of the model regarding potential political party formations are explored as
well. Under the SSPE there is the possibility for two stable political parties, one with T1 and T2
as coalition partners and one with T2 and T3 forming a political party. However, based on the
experimental outcomes there is only scope for a single stable political party, the one between T1
and T2.
One can always question the relevance of laboratory experiments for behavior outside the
lab, particularly in those cases in which payoffs are substantially more equal than the theoretical
predictions. However, it can be argued that roughly equal splits will often have considerable
drawing power outside the lab where bargainers must answer to their constituencies. Equal, or
roughly equal splits, are easy to explain to constituents and have considerable saliency of their
own. Further, in democratic governments they may have particular power as a challenger in the
next election campaign can use substantial differences in outcomes between presumably like
type constituencies against the incumbent.
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